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COMMENT
EASEMENTS ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
Todd Miller*
L Introduction
There are more than fifty million acres of Indian trust lands in the United
States, with the bulk of them located in the western half of the country.'
Thousands of miles of easements cross over Indian lands for one purpose or
another. These easements include rights-of-way for highways, railroads, electric
transmission lines, oil and gas pipelines, and various communication facilities.
They are an essential part of the nation's infrastructure. Because of the unique
legal status of tribes, the laws that apply to these easements are different in
some respects from common property law. There is a complex statutory and
regulatory scheme that pertains to obtaining an easement across Indian lands!
The legal status of these easements is critical to the tribes and the various
entities that hold the easements.
Recently the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that easements on Indian
lands are the equivalent of fee simple lands? In Big Horn County Electric
Cooperative v. Adams (Big Horn), the Court held that the easements obtained
for the Cooperative's power lines are equivalent to fee simple lands, and as
such are beyond the scope of tribal power to impose an ad valorem tax!
The Crow Tribe had enacted a utility tax calling for a 3% ad valorem tax
on all utility property located on tribal trust lands. The Act required that the
subject utilities treat the tax as an embedded cost and not pass the tax directly
on to the ratepayers. Big Horn County Electric Cooperative (the Cooperative)
is the principle supplier of electrical service on the Crow Reservation. The
Cooperative ignored the act's provision and included the tax as a separate item
on its bills. The Tribe brought suit in tribal court to enjoin the billing practice
and the Cooperative counterclaimed that the Tribe did not have the authority
*Attorney, Bonneville Power Administration. J.D., 2001, Northwest School of Law of Lewis
and Clark College, Environmental and Natural Resource Law Certificate; B.A., 1988, Northern
Arizona University. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of Professor Don Large
and the comments and encouragement of his wife, Toni Breckon-Miller.
First place winner, American Indian Law Review 2000-01 writing competition.
1. C.E. Willoughby, Native American Sovereignty Takes a Back Seat to the "Pig in the
Parlor:" The Redefining of Tribal Sovereignty in Traditional Property Law Terms, 19 S. ILL LJ.
593, 601(1995).
2. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (1994); 25 C.F.R. § 169 (2000).
3. Big Horn County lee. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000).
4. Id.
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to impose the property tax. This counterclaim was brought to the district court,
which provided summary judgment for the Cooperative and ordered all funds
collected under the tax returned.5 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the
summary judgment, but the district court's order to return all money collected
was reversed.6
Both holdings were based on the Supreme Court's recent extension of the
Montana line of cases in Strate v. A-] Contractors.7 The Strate case involved
a jurisdictional question in a tort action resulting from a traffic accident
between two nonmembers of the tribe. The accident occurred on a state
highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. In a
unanimous decision the Court held that the highway easement granted to the
state was the equivalent of non-Indian fee land and that under the Montana line
of cases the tribal court could not maintain jurisdiction over the tort claim.8
The Court proclaimed that its reasoning would also apply to regulatory
authority.9
The Ninth Circuit decision in Big Horn extended the reasoning in Strate to
apply to tribal taxation of power line easements held by a private
cooperative.'" The holding in Big.Horn is a direct attack on the Tribe's ability
to govern, because the Tribe's ability to raise taxes is central t9 tribal
sovereignty." This ruling represents a serious threat to tribal sovereignty, and
shows the proliferation of the confused state of Indian law. The Tribe decided
to restructure the utility tax to fit the exception articulated in the opinion, rather
than pursue a challenge to the opinion.'"
This comment will examine the Big Horn case by discussing the Montana
line of cases and the resulting standard that ties tribal sovereign powers to land
ownership. It will then examine a tribe's authority to tax nonmembers and the
implications of a recent Supreme Court holding that has extended the reasoning
in Montana to include tribal taxation. 3 This is followed by an analysis of
basic concepts of property law regarding easements and a breakdown of the
statutory and regulatory scheme pertaining to obtaining easements on tribal
5. Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (D. Mont. 1999).
6. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 955.
7. 520 U.S. 438 (1997). The Montana line of cases includes Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408 (1989); and South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
8. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-55.
9. Id at 453.
10. Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944 (9th Cir. 2000).
If. "The power to tax is an essential attribute of Indian Sovereignty because it is a necessary
instrument of self-government to raise revenues for its essential services." Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982).
12. Telephone Interview with Lead Counsel for the Crow Tribe, Elk River Law Office (Jan.
15, 2001) (staling that the Tribe has decided to change the tax from a property-based tax to an
activity-based tax).




lands. This analysis will show that the decision in Big Horn is erroneous and
that the Crow Tribe should have petitioned for certiorari to allow the Supreme
Court an opportunity to clarify this important aspect of Indian law.
II. The Property Theory of Sovereignty
A. Inherent Sovereignty
Tribal sovereignty is inherent, and the modem understanding of the extent
of tribal sovereignty finds its origins in the Constitution and in a set of early
Supreme Court decisions known as the Cherokee cases." In these cases the
Indian tribes were recognized as domestic dependant nations that possessed all
the attributes of sovereign nations, subject to the power of Congress to limit
tribal authority."5 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the relationship
between the tribes and the Federal Government was that of ward and
guardian.'" The tribes were independent nations that had been conquered by
the European nations. As the successor to the conquerors, the United States
took fee title to the tribal lands, but the tribes retained the exclusive right to
use and occupy portions of these lands.' This formed a trust relationship
between the tribes and the Federal Government and diminished tribal
sovereignty by placing restrictions on the tribes' ability to alienate their lands
and preventing the tribes from making treaties with foreign nations.
The courts and the other branches of the Federal Government have
recognized the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes to govern tribal members
and nonmembers within the boundaries of tribal trust lands. The executive
branch has fostered a policy of government-to-government relations with the
tribes'8 and in some regulatory capacities the tribes are given the same status
as states.'9 Most courts recognize inherent tribal sovereignty and their analysis
of tribal regulation or jurisdiction will depend on whether any act of Congress
has divested a tribe of those powers.
It is clear that tribes have sovereign power over tribal members, but
problems arise when those powers are imposed on nonmembers. The
14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (President's power to make treaties); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl.
3 (Indian Commerce Clause); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823); Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
15. John Fredericks 1II, America's First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 365-66 (1999).
16. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
17. Willoughby. supra note 1, at 598.
18. William J. Clinton, Government-to Government Relations with Native American Tribal
Governments, Memo for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951
(Apr. 29, 1994); Exec. Order No. 13,084, 63 Fed. Reg. 27,655 (May 14, 1998).
19. Under some environmental statutes tribes are given the same status as states. See City
of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 422-23 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that the Tribe's status
is that of a state for purposes of the Clean Water Act).
20. See Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905).
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underlying concern for limiting tribal control over nonmembers is based on
equal protection, because the nonmembers have no voice in tribal government.
The counter argument to this concern is that a noncitizen in any country is
subject to the sovereign powers of that country.2
The Supreme Court has held decisively that tribes do not have criminal
jurisdiction over nonmembers, but the extent to which tribal sovereign
powers, other than criminal jurisdiction, can be imposed on nonmembers is
unclear. These powers are often lumped together, but it is important to
remember that they are distinctive and some are more essential than others.
Tribal sovereign powers should be broken down into three distinct groups:
jurisdiction, regulation, and taxation. Recent Supreme Court decisions have
applied a bright line rule that does not distinguish between these different
sovereign powers."
B. The Montana Rule
The challenge of determining the extent of tribal powers over nonmembers
is compounded by the checker boarding of tribal trust lands that resulted from
the various allotment acts passed for each reservation arising from the General
Allotment Act of 1887.2 In these allotment acts trust lands were allotted to
individual tribal members and could be alienated after a number of years.
Reservations that were subjected to allotment have become a mixture of tribal
trust land and land held in fee by nonmembers. This has led courts to apply
a property ownership standard for determining tribal jurisdiction and regulatory
powers.' If the property in question was owned by a non-tribal member, state
law applied; if the property in question was owned by the tribe or a tribal
member, tribal law applied. The weakness of this standard is apparent when
considering such things as zoning regulations. When neighboring parcels are
subject to the regulatory powers of different governments, the purpose of
zoning regulations is defeated.' With sovereign powers tied to property
ownership there is a burden placed on any entity considering a business
transaction with a tribe, because it is unclear which laws will apply.
21. Willoughby, supra note 1, at 628; see also Wambdi Awanwicake Wastewin, Strate v.
A-) Contractors: hItrusion into the Sovereign Domain of Native Nations, 74 N.D. L. REv. 711,
729-30 (1998).
22. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
23. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 453 (1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley,
532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001).
24. General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-357 (1994), amended by Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934,25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994).
25. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438
(1997); Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).





Due to the broken nature of several tribes' property holdings, it would
benefit all concerned to have a standard that conforms to the exterior
boundaries of Indian lands rather than the current disconnected standard.
Allowing tribal sovereign powers to extend to the exterior boundaries of a
reservation is supported by the definition of Indian Country found in Title 18
of the U.S. Code: "Indian Country, as used in this chapter, means (a) all lands
within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation."' This would alleviate the
regulatory and jurisdictional confusion that the current disconnected property
ownership standard has imposed.' Tribes and nonmembers would know
which laws apply through out Indian Country.
The Court initiated the property ownership standard in Montana v. United
States.' The main rule established in Montana is that "a tribe's inherent
sovereign powers do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.""
The Court recognized two exceptions to its main rule, which would allow tribal
powers to apply to non-Indian fee lands within a reservation.
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealings,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.
A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil
authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its
reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect
on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or
welfare of the tribe. (citations omitted)3'
The application of the Montana rule has hinged on whether the property
concerned in a given case is held in trust for the tribe, or held in fee by a
nonmember?2 The exceptions to the main rule have been narrowly
construed?3
27. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). The definition also extends to all dependant Indian
communities and all Indian allotments that have not been extinguished.
28. The Supreme Court was unwilling to accept this rational in Atkinson Trading Co., stating
that "section 1151 simply does not address an Indian tribe's inherent or retained sovereignty over
nonmembers on non-Indian fee land." Atkinson Trading Co., 532 U.S. at 653 n.5.
29. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
30. Id. at 565.
31. Id. at 565-66.
32. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (stating that the Tribe lost power
to regulate hunting and fishing on lands that were alienated for a dam and reservoir project);
Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997) (stating that the tribal court did not have
jurisdiction over accident on highway easement held by the State).
33. See infra notes 87-104 and accompanying text.
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The issue in Montana was the Crow Tribe's power to regulate hunting and
fishing within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. The Crow Reservation
is a typical example of the fractured land ownership resulting from allotment.
Trust lands comprise about 70% of the reservation, while 28% of the
reservation is held in fee by nonmembers.' The focus of the case was on
regulatory control of the Big Horn River, which runs through the middle of the
reservation. The State of Montana brought a quiet title action to establish
regulatory jurisdiction over the river. The Tribe relied on several canons of
treaty construction, which establish that treaties should be interpreted as the
Indians would have understood them; treaties must be liberally construed in
favor of the tribe; and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the tribe!'
But the Court ignored these basic canons of treaty construction to find that the
river did not pass to the Tribe under the treaty that set aside the reservation.
The Montana Court reasoned that the United States had held the riverbed in
trust and that it passed to the state under the equal footing doctrine.?
The Tribe's authority to regulate hunting and fishing on nonmember fee
lands was also at issue in Montana. The Court crafted the Montana rule to bar
tribal regulation of hunting and fishing on state-owned lands and fee lands
owned by nonmembers. This construction has led other courts to use the
property ownership status of land as the threshold question for deciding if the
Montana rule applies in a particular case? Problems have arisen when the
Montana rule is extended to cover other issues, and subsequent holdings have
shown that the exceptions to the Montana rule are subject to multiple
interpretations.
C. The Confusion of Applying the Montana Rule
The Montana rule appears rather clear, but the lower courts have been
unable to apply it consistently. In addition, the Supreme Court's plurality
holding in Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yalima Indian
Nation' shows that the Court itself could not decide on the proper application
of the Montana rule. In that case the issue concerned tribal zoning regulations
34. Specifically, the ownership of Crow Reservation lands is broken down as follows:
Roughly 52 percent of the reservation is allotted to members of the Tribe and held
by the United States in trust for them, 17 percent is held in trust for the Tribe
itself, and approximately 28 percent is held in fee by non-Indians. The State of
Montana owns in fee simple 2 percent of the reservation, the United States less
than 1 percent.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 548.
35. Fredericks, supra note 15, at 369; see Montana, 450 U.S. at 569 (Blackmun, .,
dissenting). These canons of treaty construction should also apply to statutory interpretation.
36. Montana, 450 U.S. at 551-52.
37. "The threshold question in this appeal is whether Montana's main rule applies, that is,
whether the property rights at issue are such that the land may be deemed alienated to non-
Indians." Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 2000).
38. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
[Vol. 26
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as applied to two separate tracts of land owned in fee by nonmembers. One of
the tracts was in an open section of the reservation, which included a mixture
of nonmember fee lands and tribal allotments held in trust. The other tract was
in a closed area surrounded by lands held in trust for the Tribe, and subject to
strict tribal regulation. The Tribe's zoning regulation prohibited the owners
from pursuing their development plans, and the nonmembers claimed that
county zoning regulations should apply to their lands. The Court had a decisive
split on the application of the Montana rule. Four of the Justices, led by Justice
White, held that the Tribe did not have regulatory authority over nonmembers
and that neither Montana exception applied."' On the other hand Justice
Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, contended that the Tribe's
zoning authority was inherent and that Montana's second exception should be
broadly construed to include any nonmember activity that has a direct effect
on the Tribe's political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare.'
But the actual holding of the Court was a compromise written by Justice
Stevens and joined by Justice O'Connor. Stevens reasoned that the Tribe's strict
regulation of the closed area was sufficient to allow tribal zoning of
nonmember lands, but that the character of the open area was such that county
zoning regulations should prevail." As to the property in the closed area,
Stevens concurred with Justice Blackmun, but in reference to the property in
the open area, he concurred with Justice White. This case demonstrates that the
Montana rule is anything but clear.
The Blackmun opinion in Brendale pointed out that prior to Montana the
Court's only holding that had restricted tribal sovereignty was Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, barring criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers.'
Prior to Montana the Court had exercised a presumption of tribal sovereignty
over reservation lands, and to reconcile Montana's reversal of this presumption,
Justice Blackmun argued that the Montana exceptions should be interpreted
liberally. 3
In the cases that followed Brendale the reversed presumption of Montana
has generally been applied, and most courts have followed Justice White's
approach of construing the Montana exceptions narrowly. One exception to
this was the Ninth Circuit's holding in Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v.
Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation." In this case the circuit
court upheld the Tribe's inherent sovereign power to impose a utility property
tax on the railroad easement that crossed the reservation. The Court did not use
a Montana analysis, because it found that the railroad easement was not
39. Id. at 421-33.
40. Id. at 448-67.
41. Id. at 433-48.
42. Id, at 453.
43. I at 456-59.
44. 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991), cerL denied, 505 U.S. 1212 (1992).
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nonmember fee land. Instead the Court based its holding on Merrion v.
Jicarilla Apache Tribe and found that the railroad benefited from tribal
services, making it subject to tribal taxation4 Blackfeet Tribe was expressly
overruled in Big Horn
The Supreme Court revisited the Montana rule in South Dakota v.
Bourland. This case had a fact pattern similar to Montana, and the Court
held that acts of Congress creating a reservoir on tribal lands divested the Tribe
of the right to regulate hunting and fishing by nonmembers on the reservoir.
Two different statutes affected the land at issue, the Cheyenne River Act and
the Flood Control Act of 1944.5 The Eighth Circuit considered the effect on
the Tribe's regulatory authority based on the intent of Congress expressed in
each statute. The circuit court concluded that the majority of the lands under
the reservoir were taken under the Cheyenne River Act, and there was no
congressional intent in the Act to divest the Tribe of its regulatory authority!'
The Supreme Court reversed this holding and stressed that the lands were
alienated by the Act and that in itself was enough to abrogate the Tribe's power
to regulate.' The Court reasoned that the Tribe lost the power to exclude
nonmembers and the Tribe's regulatory authority was tied to the power to
exclude.'
This case enforced the distinction between tribal trust lands and nonmember
fee lands. In cases that question tribal sovereign powers it is essential for
nonmembers to establish that the land is not held in trust for the tribe. This
will allow for the application of the Montana rule with its narrow exceptions.
This land base requirement led to the strange holding in Strate v. A-I
Contractors which was extended in Big Horn. In Strate the Court had to
find that the Tribe had alienated the land underlying the highway right-of-way
to fit the case into the nonmember fee property model that would allow for the
use of the Montana rule. The Strate Court was able to find that, because the
highway right-of-way was equivalent to nonmember fee land, the tribal courts
lacked jurisdiction. A basic premise running through these cases is that tribes
retain their sovereign powers subject to abrogation by Congress. The Court has
45. Id. at 902-04.
46. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
47. Blackfeet Tribe, 924 F.2d at 904.
48. "Because the result in Blackfeet Tribe was based upon the classification of the right-of-
way as Indian land, and that status has been subsequently altered by Strate, Blackfeet Tribe is no
longer good law." Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 953 (9th Cir. 2000).
49. 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
50. Cheyenne River Act, 68 Stat. 1191 (setting the amount paid to the tribe for 104,420 acres
of trust lands flooded by the reservoir). Another 18,000 acres was taken from nonmember fee
owners under the Flood Control Act of 1944, 16 U.S.C. § 460d (2000).
51. South Dakota v. Bourland, 949 F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1991).
52. Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689.
53. Id.




found that the lands were alienated through an act of Congress, and that
alienation implicitly abrogated a tribe's sovereign powers. The act of Congress
in Strate was the legislation passed in 1948 that authorized the Secretary of
Interior, with the consent of the proper tribal officials, to grant rights-of-way
across tribal lands0 The Court saw this delegation as an affirmative act by
Congress to divest the Tribe of its jurisdictional authority over the highway
right-of-way.'
The lower court cases that have followed Strate employ the same pattern of
showing that the land was alienated and the tribes' sovereign powers over the
land implicitly taken away. In Montana Department of Transportation v.
King" the Ninth Circuit found tribal employment regulations inapplicable to
state highway maintenance workers doing a job on the state highway that
crossed the reservation. In another recent case, Burlington Northern Railroad
Co. v. Red Wolf, the Ninth Circuit found that the Crow Tribal Court did not
have jurisdiction over a personal injury suit that was based on an accident
between tribal members and a train, because the accident occurred on the
railroad right-of-way through the Crow Reservation.w Interestingly this case
distinguished the Tribe's power to tax from its regulatory and jurisdictional
powers. The Tribe relied on Blackfeet Tribe to argue that because it had the
power to tax the railroad easement, it should also have civil jurisdiction over
the easement. The Court rejected this argument, stating "because a tribe's
taxation power is broader than its civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over
nonmembers, the Tribe's authority to tax the right-of-way is not dispositive..'
It is also important to note that this Ninth Circuit panel included retired
Supreme Court Justice White, who authored the portion of the plurality opinion
in Brendale that was against all tribal zoning regulation.
The holdings in Montana, Brendale, and Bourland abrogated tribal
regulatory authority over nonmembers. The holding in Strate abrogated the
Tribes' civil jurisdiction and extended the definition of fee lands to include
easements. Following Strate the only tribal sovereign power that remained
relatively intact was a tribe's ability to tax nonmembers within the boundaries
of the reservation. The tragedy of the Big Horn decision is that it abrogates
55. Id. at 454-55; 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (2000).
56. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456 (quoting Bourland, 508 U.S. at 689) ("Tribe's loss of 'right of
absolute and exclusive use and occupation ... implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the
use of the land by others.'")
57. 191 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 1999).
58. Id The purpose of the regulation was to give tribal members preferential treatment for
jobs contracted on the Reservation. The Court recognized the importance of these regulations,
but determined that the Tribe did not meet either exception under Montana.
59. 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999).
60. Id
61. Id. at 1064.
62. The power to tax nonmembers within the boundaries of tribal trust land was severely
No. 1]
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this last vestige of tribal sovereignty and it does so by relying on bad property
law.
II. Tribal Taxation of Nonmembers
A. Foundations of the Taxing Power
The power to tax is at the core of all sovereign power, because without the
revenue raised through taxation the sovereign is unable to carry out any of its
other functions. The courts have recognized this fact and have consistently
upheld a tribe's power to tax nonmembers. In an early Supreme Court case,
Morris v. Hitchcock, the nonmembers argued that the Chickasaw Tribe's tax on
livestock grazed by nonmembers on the reservation was unconstitutional."
The Court held that the Tribe's right to control the presence of intruders in its
territory was recognized in the treaty and sanctioned by Congress. The
Secretary of Interior had approved the tax and the Court held that the Secretary
had the authority to enforce it."
An early Eighth Circuit opinion, Buster v. Wright, was the first to address
the issue of tribal taxation of nonmembers on fee lands.' This case involved
a business permit tax imposed by the Creek Tribe on all nonmember businesses
within their reservation. The plaintiffs were owners in fee of lots in recently
designated town sites within the reservation. The Court held that the purchase
of these lots by nonmembers did not remove them from the jurisdiction of the
tribal laws. This case made a strong statement for setting the limits of tribal
sovereignty based on the outer boundaries of a reservation."
In more recent cases the Supreme Court has upheld the tribal taxation
power. Just prior to establishing the Montana rule, the Court upheld a tribe's
power to tax nonmembers in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation." The Court held that the Tribe may tax nonmembers
engaged in trade with the Tribe or residing on tribal lands, and recognized that
taxation is "a fundamental attribute of sovereignty. '
limited by the Court's recent holding. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
63. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
64. Id at 389.
65. Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
66. "But the jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited
by title to the land which they occupy in it, or by the existence of municipalities therein endowed
with the power to collect taxes for city purposes .... " Id at 951. "They [the Tribe] still exist
as a nation, and they still continue to occupy that country, notwithstanding the fact that those who
are noncitizens of their tribe hold the title to and occupy isolated lots and tracts of land therein."
d at 952.
67. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The tax at issue was a cigarette tax imposed on nonmembers
making purchases on the reservation.
68. id at 152. The Court went on to state that no federal statute had divested the Tribe's
power to tax nonmembers in cases where the Tribe has a significant interest in the subject matter,




Six days after the Court issued its opinion in Montana, the Court heard oral
arguments for Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.' This case was a challenge
to a severance tax imposed on the production from oil and gas wells located
on the reservation. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe had executed oil and gas leases
with the plaintiffs that encompassed a substantial portion of the reservation.
These leases produced rents and royalties for the Tribe for a number of years,
and then as an additional charge the Tribe imposed the severance tax. The
plaintiffs claimed that the tax was unjust, because it was not part of the lease
contracts. The Court distinguished between the Tribe's role as commercial
partner that granted the leases, and the Tribe as a sovereign government
capable of imposing the tax.' The Tribe did not waive its power to tax by
contracting with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also argued that tribal authority
to tax nonmembers came from the Tribe's power to exclude, and because the
leases removed this power to exclude, the Tribe no longer had the power to
impose the tax. The Court relied on Buster and stated, "the Tribe's authority
to tax derives not from its power to exclude, but from its power to govern and
to raise revenues to pay for the costs of government."'
The Court upheld the Tribe's power to impose a tax on nonmembers when
the Tribe has a substantial interest in the nonmembers activity or if the
nonmembers are availing themselves of tribal services. Recognizing that the
power of tribes to tax is well established, the Court stated: "the views of the
three federal branches of government, as well as general principles of taxation,
confirm that Indian tribes enjoy authority to finance their governmental services
through taxation of non-Indians who benefit from those services."' There are
some constraints on a tribe's ability to tax nonmembers. The power can be
taken away by the federal government and the tax must be approved by the
Secretary of Interior before it can take effect. These constraints insure that the
tribes will not impose unfair taxes and that the tax is in line with national
policy."
It is interesting to note that the Court did not cite Montana anywhere in its
Merrion opinion. This would imply one of two things. Montana did not apply
because the leases did not alienate tribal lands, or Montana does not apply to
taxation. In Merrion the Court did set a standard for deciding if a nonmember
is subject to tribal taxation. As stated above, if a tribe has a substantial interest
69. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
70. Id. at 145-46.
71. Id. at 144. The Court did go on to give an alternative rationale. If the power to tax is
derived from the power to exclude, the Tribe still retains the power to condition the nonmembers
right to remain on the reservation.
72. Id. at 140.
73. Id. at 141; see also Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985)
(holding that the Navajo Tribe did not need consent from the Secretary of Interior prior to
imposing a tax, because it was not required under the Navajo Constitution and no other statute
requires the consent).
No. 1]
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in the nonmembers activity or the nonmembers benefit from tribal services,
tribal taxation is valid. This was the test used by the Ninth Circuit in Blackfeet
Tribe, upholding the utility tax on the railroad right-of-way. In that case the
Tribe's substantial interest was that the railroad crossed tribal lands and the
benefits received by the railroad were police and fire protection, and the
intangible benefits of civilized society.'
If the Ninth Circuit had applied the Merrion standard in Big Horn, the Court
would have sustained the Tribe's power to tax the Cooperative. The Tribe has
a substantial interest in its supply of electricity. The benefits received by the
Cooperative are the same as in Blackfeet Tribe and most of the Cooperative's
customers are tribal members. The Court did not address these benefits and it
discounted Merrion and Confederated Tribes as only applying to tribal trust
lands.7 Instead, the Court followed Strate, and applied the Montana rule to
the Cooperative's easements.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Attempt to Balance Merrion and Montana
A complete contrast to Big Horn was the Tenth Circuit's holding in Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley,6 decided two months before the issuance of the Big
Horn decision. The Atkinson dispute involved a hotel occupancy tax imposed
by the Navajo Tribe on all hotels within the reservation. An 8% tax was
imposed on hotel guests. Atkinson Trading Company challenged the tax,
claiming that as a nonmember with its property held in fee, it was beyond the
Tribe's taxing authority. In a split decision the circuit court held that Atkinson's
guests were subject to the taxing power of the Tribe, because the Tribe
provided police, fire, and emergency services for the property, and the
"establishment of civilized society.""
The opinion recognized that Montana and Strate are in conflict with
Merrion, and the circuit court attempted to reconcile these cases by employing
a case-by-case balancing test.' This balancing test weighs "the impact of the
nonmember's conduct against the severity of the tribal regulations."' The
74. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d
899 (9th Cir. 1991).
75. Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir. 2000).
76. 210 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
77. 1d. at 1262.
78. The Tenth Circuit found that the intent of the Supreme Court was to create a case-by-
case test:
This case-by-case approach seems clearly to have been the result the Montana
Court intended when it held on the one hand that the "inherent sovereign powers
of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers," but on the other
hand that "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms
of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservation, even on non-Indian fee
land."
Id. at 1257 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).




Tenth Circuit applied the Montana rule, but it relied on Brendale and Buster
to decide that the fee status of the land was a factor, "but not the determining
factor" in the balancing test." The tax was imposed on the hotel guests, so the
court analyzed the guest's relationship to the Tribe. Using the Montana
framework, the court found that the first exception to the rule applied, because
the hotel guests had formed an implied consensual relationship with the Tribe
by deciding to spend the night on the reservation and availing themselves of
tribal services!' The Supreme Court reversed this holding in a unanimous
decision that does not allow for a balancing test and construes the Montana
exceptions narrowly.'
The Supreme Court focused on the fact that Merrion involved nonmember
use of tribal lands and therefore it did not "exempt taxation from Montana's
general rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on non-
Indian fee land."' The Court admitted "[tihere are undoubtedly parts of the
Merrion opinion that suggest a broader scope for tribal taxing authority," but
the Court restricted its reading of Merrion to hold that "[alan Indian tribe's
sovereign power to tax - whatever its derivation - reaches no further than
tribal lands."" Based on this interpretation of Merrion the Court applied
Montana to the facts in Atkinson and thus required the Tribe to fit the hotel
occupancy tax into one of the Montana exceptions." The Court interpreted the
exceptions narrowly and did not accept the Tenth Circuit's finding that a
consensual relationship existed based on the hotel guest's decision to stay
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. The Court held that the
consensual relationship, of Montana's first exception, required more than "a
nonmembers actual or potential receipt of tribal police, fire, or medical
services."' With this narrow interpretation of the Montana exceptions, the
hotel occupancy tax imposed on nonmember fee lands was held to be beyond
tribal authority.
The holdings in Big Horn and Atkinson followed the trend of the courts
towards constricting tribal sovereignty. The Crow Tribe passed up the
opportunity to take the Big Horn decision to the Supreme Court. This leaves
bad precedent in the Ninth Circuit that affects all tribes, because it extends
Strate to cover all kinds of easements and limits tribes' power of taxation. The
80. id. at 1256.
81. Id. at 1261-63.
82. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
83. l d at 653.
84. Id. It is interesting to note that the phrases the Court quoted from Merrion were part of
the argument advanced in Merrion to show that the sovereign power to tax is based on more than
the power to exclude. In Merrion the taxing power was tied to nonmembers availing themselves
of tribal service, but the Atkinson Court refused to recognize any tribal taxing power beyond tribal
lands. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 136-44 (1982).
85. Atkinson, 532 U.S. at 653.
86. Id.
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Court's holding in Atkinson hinders any attempt to impose tribal taxes on
nonmembers, and tribal sovereignty will be shackled by these decisions. The
facts in Big Horn were better for the Tribe than those presented to the Court
in Atkinson. It may have been easier to get the narrow interpretation of the
Ninth Circuit reversed, then to have the Court uphold a new balancing test and
a broad interpretation of the Montana exceptions in Atkinson. If the Crow
Tribe had petitioned for certiorari in Big Horn the case would have presented
better facts to the Court, and the Court may have limited Strate and recognized
the importance of a clearer interpretation of the Montana exceptions.
C. The Montana Exceptions
The Montana exceptions appear to be clear and easy to apply, but most
courts have struggled with the exceptions and there has been a tendency to
look for ways to narrow the exceptions.' The first exception, as discussed
above, applies to consensual relationships. The Montana Court provided
examples of these relationships such as "commercial dealings, contracts, leases,
or other arrangements. ' This would seem to call for a broad interpretation,
which encompasses most transactions between a tribe and a nonmember.
However, most courts have required that the consensual relationship be ongoing
and that there be a direct nexus between the consensual relationship and the
issue before the court. In Red Wolf the first exception was discarded by
reasoning that the right-of-way was granted by tribal consent, but this was a
property transfer and not an ongoing consensual relationship.' In Strate the
defendant, A-I Contractors, was engaged in subcontract work for the Tribe, but
the Court held that the traffic accident at issue in the case did not have a direct
nexus to the subcontract.L ' The Montana opinion lists Williams v. Lee,9
Hitchcock, Buster, and Colville as examples of consensual relationships.' The
87. Bugenig v. Hoopa Valley Tribe, 229 F.3d 1210, 1219-20 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Noting the
tribes' 'diminished status as sovereigns,' the Montana Court pointed to two narrow exceptions to
its general rule.") ("Although broadly framed, [the second Montana] exception is narrowly
construed") (quoting County of Lewis v. Allen, 163 F.3d 509, 515 (9th Cir. 1998)).
88. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
89. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1064 (9th Cir. 1999); see Montana
Dep't of Transp. v. King, 191 F.3d 1108, 1113-14 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that transfers of
property interests between government entities create property rights; they generally do not create
continuing consensual relationships.").
90. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 457 (1997). Strate did not have a consensual
relationship with the Tribe and A-rs agent was simply driving the highway at the time of the
accident. The Court noted in its fact statement that the record did not show whether A-I's agent
was engaged in the subcontract work at the time of the accident, and this is not addressed in the
opinion. Id. at 438. If he were engaged in subcontract work at the time of the accident the nexus
between the consensual relationship and the accident would have been stronger.
91. 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (holding that tribal courts have jurisdiction over disputes between
tribal member and nonmember merchant operating a store on a reservation).
92. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66; Strate, 520 U.S. at 457 (citing Morris v. Hitchcock, 194




Tenth Circuit opinion in Atkinson relied on the reference to Buster in both
Montana and Strate as an example of a consensual relationship, and liberally
construed the first exception to include an implied consensual relationship.r
The Supreme Court's Atkinson opinion stated that it has never endorsed the
Eighth Circuit holding in Buster, other than to provide guidance for what may
constitute a consensual relationship for the first Montana exception." The
only thing clear about Montana's first exception is that its application is open
to a variety of interpretations.
The second exception could also be broadly construed, but has been limited
by concern that the exception could swallow the rule.r The exception
recognizes that tribes may retain inherent authority over nonmembers conduct
"on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and
welfare of the tribe.""
In Strate the Tribe claimed that highway safety has a direct effect on the
Tribe's health and welfare. The Court held that this broad of an interpretation
of "the exception would severely shrink the rule."' Instead the Court
elaborated on the context of the Montana exceptions and held that the second
exception only applies if the inherent power "is necessary to protect tribal self-
government or to control internal relations."" This same reasoning was
applied in Red Wolf, holding that the fact that the injured plaintiff is a tribal
member was not enough to invoke the second exception.w In Big Horn the
Tribe argued that its economic security, health, and welfare are affected by its
ability to tax and raise revenues to support important tribal services. The Court
used the "exception swallowing the rule" argument and reasoned that if this
logic were followed "virtually any tribal tax would then fall under the second
exception," and this was unacceptable."®
The second exception has been used sparingly, and only a few cases have
turned on the exception. In Montana v. EPA' the Ninth Circuit recognized
the Flathead Tribe's interest in water quality as fitting within the exception.
The State challenged the EPA's decision to grant the Tribe regulatory status
F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905) (dealing with a business permit tax imposed on all nonmembers doing
business inside the exterior boundaries of the Reservation); Washington v. Confederated Tribes
of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152-53 (1980) (nonmembers entering
Reservation to purchase cigarettes).
93. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 532
U.S. 645 (2001).
94. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 n.4 (2001).
95. Strate, 520 U.S. at 458.
96. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
97. Strate, 520 U.S. at 458.
98. Id. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564).
99. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (9th Cir. 1999).
100. Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 951 (9th Cir. 2000).
101. 137 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998).
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under the Clean Water Act. The Court upheld the EPA's finding "that the
activities of the non-members posed such serious and substantial threats to
Tribal health and welfare that Tribal regulation was essential."'" The Eighth
Circuit recognized the second exception in Duncan Energy Co. v. Three
Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation." This case did not
address the merits of the exception, but the Court reversed a summary
judgment by the district court because the lower court did not analyze the
applicability of the exception." 4
The Big Horn opinion gave both Montana exceptions short shift, but a good
argument can be made that both exceptions apply to the Tribe's utility tax. In
Big Horn the Court conceded that there was a consensual relationship between
the Cooperative and the Tribe, but the Court hyper-analyzed the language in
Montana and determined that the consensual relationship exception did not
apply to a property tax. The Court focused on the reference in Montana's first
exception to "the activities of nonmembers who enter [into] consensual
relationships." From this language the Court held that the Tribe's ad valorem
tax was a property tax rather than a tax on an activity and therefore was not
covered by the first exception."m The Court's parsing of participles ignored
the preceding language in Montana: "A tribe may regulate through taxation,
licensing, or other means. . . ."" The Montana exception did not specify the
kind of tax a tribe may impose, and a property tax is a basic form of
taxation."tm
The Big Horn decision left open the possibility that the Tribe could
restructure the tax, so as to tax an activity rather than property, and this would
meet the Montana exception."t If the tribe imposed a tax on the amount of
power delivered by the Cooperative, this would appear to be an activity, and
it would be on all fours with the tax in Merrion imposed on the amount of oil
and gas produced. The Tribe has decided to rely on this possibility and is
changing the structure of the utility tax to fit the Ninth Circuit's interpretation
102. ILd. at 1141; see aLvo Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 52 (9th Cir.
1981).
103. 27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994).
104. ld. at 1299. The Tribe had imposed a 1% property tax on all real and personal property
used in business or for profit within the Reservation. The lower court had held that homesteading
had diminished the section of the Reservation on which the plaintiff operated its business. The
circuit court reversed this and the case was remanded for a Montana analysis.
105. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 951 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565
(1981)).
106. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
107. See Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 195 (1985) (upholding a
3% tribal tax on possessory interests of mineral leaseholds.) This case did not employ a Montana
analysis, but this case and Blackfeet Tribe approved tribal property taxes. Burlington N. R.R. Co.
v. Blackfeet Tribe of the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, 924 F.2d 899 (9th Cir. 1991).
108. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 951.
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of the Montana exception." The Court's interpretation was misguided,
because property taxes are a valid measure of the Cooperative's activity on the
reservation. Without the easements the Cooperative would not have any
activity on the reservation. The Big Horn Court relied on the reasoning in Red
Wolf to extend Strate and show that a Montana analysis was proper, but the
Court ignored the distinction between taxation and adjudicatory jurisdiction
made in Red Wolf."' Again, this was based on Strate and the requirement
that all tribal sovereign powers come from property ownership."' No other
cases have found a consensual relationship and still denied the tribe's right to
exercise its sovereign power. In addition, the Cooperative has a continuing
relationship with the Tribe, because tribal consent is required for all expansion
of electric service. Also, the rights-of-way were only granted for a term of fifty
years, and tribal consent is required to renew the term."' All of this suggests
that the Tribe still retains some control over the rights-of-way and it follows
that a property tax is reasonable.
The only second exception argument addressed in the Big Horn opinion is
that tax revenues are necessary for tribal government functions." Another
possible second exception argument is based on the necessity of electricity. As
the only electric service provider on the Crow Reservation, the Cooperative has
a direct effect on the Tribe's political integrity and economic security, and if
the electric service is not reliable there is a direct threat to the Tribe's health
and welfare. Some control over the Cooperative is necessary for the Tribe to
maintain its self-government and to control internal relations. Both Montana
exceptions could have applied in Big Horn, but this analysis was not necessary
if common property law was applied to the rights-of-way, and the intent of
Congress in providing for the establishment of the rights-of-way is considered.
IV. The Nature of the Easements
A. Common Law Understanding of Easements
The basic contention in Strate, Red Wolf, and Big Horn is that the rights-of-
way granted by the Secretary of Interior, with the consent of the Tribes, are the
equivalent of nonmember fee land."4 This is a misinterpretation of basic
property law.
109. See supra note 12.
110. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1999).
111. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 950 ("Furthermore, the Supreme Court pronounced in Strate that
legislative and adjudicative jurisdiction are coextensive, so there is no merit to the contention that
Red Wolf and Strate are inapplicable because they fixed only the limits of adjudicative
jurisdiction.").
112. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (2000); 25 C.F.R. § 169 (2001).
113. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 951.
114. Id at 950; Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,454-56 (1997); Burlington N. R.R.
Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1062-63 (9th Cir. 1999).
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The grants for these rights-of-way state explicitly that they are easements
for the purpose of a designated use." ' According to Thompson on Real
Property:
The right in land held by an easement owner differs from the
fee interest or even the leasehold interest in that it is a "use"
interest, but not a "possessory" interest in the land. Thus the
easement holder has neither the permanent possession of even a
single molecule of the land itself, nor the exclusive time-bound
possession granted by a lease. Instead the easement holder has the
right to make or control a particular use of the land that remains
owned by another."'
The easements granted in all these cases were only use interests and no
possessory interest was passed to the nonmember grantees.
An easement has many characteristics that distinguish it from a fee simple.
The easement holder can only use the land, and only the fee owner can occupy
or possess the land."7 The easement is only for a specified purpose, and the
easement holder can only use the easement to the extent that is reasonably
necessary for the specific purpose. This is contrasted against a fee owner, who
can make any use of the land not specifically prohibited."' An easement can
be abandoned, while a possessory interest can never be abandoned."' The
Department of Interior regulation pertaining to Indian trust land easements
states that a right-of-way may be terminated for: "(a) Failure to comply with
any term or condition of the grant or the applicable regulation; (b) A nonuse
of the right-of-way for a consecutive 2-year period for the purpose for which
it was granted; [or] (c) An abandonment of the right-of-way."'"
Another distinguishing characteristic of an easement is that the possessory
owner and the easement holder can use the land simultaneously. "The person
who holds the land burdened by a servitude is entitled to make all uses of the
land that are not prohibited by the servitude and that do not interfere
unreasonably with the uses authorized by the easement... .""' For example,
a tribe can graze cattle on an electric power line easement, or the tribal
115. Strait, 520 U.S. at 455; 25 C.P.R. § 169.18 (2001).
116. DAVID A. THOMAS, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 60.02(c), at 393 (1994)
[hereinafter THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY]; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY
SERVITUDES § 1.2, at 12 (2000) ("An easement creates a nonpossessory right to enter and use
land in the possession of another."); JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY JR., THE L.Aw OF
EASEMENTS AND LiCENSES IN LAND 1 1.01, at 1-2 (1995) ("An easement is commonly defined
as a nonpossessory interest in land of another.").
117. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 116, 1.01, at 1-2.
118. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY SERVITUDES § 1.2, at 15.
119. Id.
120. Termination of Right-of-Way Grants, 25 C.F.R. § 169.20 (2001).
121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY SERVITUDE § 4.9, at 582.
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members can travel on the public highway easement." In addition fee
owners receive some substantive and procedural rights unavailable to an
easement holder.'"
Some cases raise the issue of whether a grant conveys an easement or a
possessory interest in land. The language in the granting clause may clearly
state that it is an easement, but in many cases the courts must determine the
intent of the parties. As a general rule most courts have held that a grant "of
a 'right-of-way' creates only an easement.''L The Department of Interior
regulation explicitly states that "all rights-of-way granted under the regulations
in this part 169 shall be in the nature of easements."'" There is no doubt that
the rights-of-way granted across tribal lands are easements.'" If there are any
ambiguities in the grants a court should remember the canons of construction,
and decide the ambiguity in favor of the tribes. 7 As easements, the tribes
retain the underlying possessory interest in the rights-of-way, contrary to the
assertions of the Supreme Court in Strate.'
B. Statutes and Regulations
Easements are clearly distinguishable from fee lands and Congress has
passed several statutes that provide special procedures for creating an easement
across tribal trust lands. Starting from the primary premise that the whole
purpose of trust lands is to prevent unauthorized alienation, easements across
land held in trust for a tribe cannot be obtained through prescription or by
necessity." The only way to obtain these easements is by the procedures set
out in the statutes and detailed in the regulations. This requires approval from
the Secretary of Interior and written consent from the appropriate tribal
officials.' Public entities with the power of eminent domain can not
condemn easements across tribal trust lands, because the statutes require tribal
consent and this "is the very antithesis of the exercise of the power of eminent
domain.''
122. 25 C.F.R. § 169.5(k) (2001) (requiring that the easement holder not interfere with any
use by the possessory owner that does not impair the specific use of the easement).
123. BRUCE & ELY, supra note 116,1 1.06, at 1-37.
124. 1l 1.06[t], 1-39; see THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY, supra note 116, §
60.03(a)(7)(i), at 417 ("Deeds that in the granting clause state they are conveying a right of way
over, across or upon certain lands generally are construed to grant an easement. Terms such as
right of way, road or roadway bring a strong, almost conclusive, indication that the interest
conveyed is an easement.") (internal quotations and cites omitted).
125. 25 C.F.R. § 169.18 (2001).
126. Strate v. A-I Contractors. 520 U.S. 438, 455 (1997) ("In the granting instrument, the
United States conveyed to North Dakota 'an easement for a right-of-way ... .
127. See supra note 35.
128. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-56.
129. Imperial Granite Co. v. Pain Band of Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th Cir.
1991).
130. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-324 (2000).
131. Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 550, 553 (9th Cir. 1983); see also
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Congress passed several different statutes regarding tribal easements as
settlement and technology advanced, and the need arose. Originally there was
a separate statute for each type of easement: railroads, highways, pipelines,
etc.' Each statute empowered the Secretary of Interior to grant easements
subject to such requirements as he deemed necessary, but the provisions of
each statute were slightly different. Only some of the statutes referred to
allotted trust lands and the different statutory requirements imposed a great
burden on the Department of Interior. For certain types of easements the
Department had to get an easement deed signed by all owners of an allotted
parcel. This could be next to impossible, because the interests in the allotments
had been spread out through a couple generations of inheritance.'33 In 1948
Congress passed an act that clarified and consolidated the various statutes."M
The Act directed the Secretary to proscribe regulations and required tribal
consent. Providing a uniform statute relieved the administrative burden, and an
exception was provided for consent in cases where the owners of allotted land
could not be located.
The Secretary promulgated comprehensive regulations stating the
requirements for obtaining approval for a right-of-way and setting the terms
and conditions attached to each type of right-of-way.' The regulations
specify that the party seeking an easement must acquire written consent from
the proper tribal official prior to applying for approval." Some of the terms
addressed in the regulations are: consideration for the right-of-way ("shall be
not less than but not limited to the fair market value of the rights granted"); 37
tenure of an approved grant (is left to the discretion of the secretary, but the
term is set at fifty years for most types of easements); 3" renewal of right-of-
way grants (written tribal consent and consideration is required for a
renewal); 39 and termination of the right-of-way."4  The regulations also
provide specification for the extent of each type of easement. 4' This
elaborate regulatory scheme leaves no doubt that the rights-of-way are
Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. 100.95 Acres of Land in County of Thurston, 719 F.2d 956 (8th
Cir. 1983).
132. 25 U.S.C. §§ 312-318 (2000) (rights-of-way for railroads, telegraph, and telephone lines,
and town-site stations, enacted 1899); 25 U.S.C. § 311 (2000) (opening highways, enacted 1901);
25 U.S.C. § 321 (2000) (rights-of-way for pipe lines, enacted 1904); 43 U.S.C. § 961 (1994)
(rights-of-way through public lands, Indian, and other reservations for power and communications
facilities, enacted 1911).
133. S. REP. No. 80-823 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1033, 1036.
134. 25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328 (2000).
135. 25 C.F.R. §§ 169.1-169.28 (2001).
136. 25 C.F.R. § 169.3 (2001).
137. 25 C.F.R. § 169.12 (2001).
138. 25 C.F.R. § 169.18 (2001).
139. 25 C.F.R. § 169.19 (2001).
140. See supra note 120.




easements and the possessory interest remains held in trust by the Federal
Government for the tribes. When the Department of Interior is applying these
regulations, they must do so in the tribes' best interest, in order to fulfill their
fiduciary duty to the tribes.
Several courts have upheld these statutes and regulations in the context of
challenges to the necessity for tribal consent." The one exception going
against the tribes is that a distinction has been carved out for allotted lands.
The 1948 Act explicitly stated that it did not repeal any existing laws
pertaining to rights-of-way over Indian lands. 3 This was done to avoid any
possible confusion and to preserve the existing statutory authority.'" A law
that was passed during the allotment era allows for the condemnation of
allotted lands "in the same manner as land owned in fee."' 45 Courts have
reconciled this by holding that easements across allotted trust lands can be
obtained by either a condemnation proceeding or by following the requirements
of the 1948 Act'" In Nebraska Public Power District v. 100.95 Acres of
Land in County of Thurston the allotment owners avoided this result by
deeding their remainder interest to the Tribe and retaining a life estate. The
Eighth Circuit held that the Tribe's remainder interest in the land was sufficient
to require that only the 1948 Act would apply to the easement."7 The
easements at issue in Big Horn cross a mixture of tribal trust lands and allotted
lands, but they were all granted under the procedures of the 1948 Act.'"
C. Strate Application of Statutes and Property Law
In Strate the grant to the state for the public highway conveyed "an
easement for a right-of-way for the realignment and improvement of North
Dakota State highway No. 8 over, across and upon [specified] lands." The
state's "easement is subject to any valid existing right or adverse claim and is
without limitation as to tenure, so long as said easement shall be actually used
for the purpose . . . specified."'49 Obviously the right-of-way was an
easement, and it was granted in 1970 pursuant to the 1948 Act.'" The Strate
142. Blackfeet Indian Tribe v. Montana Power Co., 838 F.2d 1055 (9th Cir. 1988); Southern
Pac. Transp. Co. v. Watt, 700 F.2d 550,554 (9th Cir. 1983); Coast Indian Cmty. v. United States,
550 F.2d 639 (Ct. CI. 1977).
143. 25 U.S.C. § 326 (2000).
144. S. REP. No. 80-823 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1033, 1036.
145. 25 U.S.C. § 357 (2000).
146. Yellowfish v. City of Stillwater, 691 F.2d 926, 930 (10th Cir. 1982); Southern Cal.
Edison Co. v. Rice, 685 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1982); Nicodemus v. Washington Water Power
Co., 264 F.2d 614, 618 (9th Cir. 1959).
147. Nebraska Pub. Power Dist. v. 100.95 Acres of Land in County of Thurston, 719 F.2d
956, 962 (8th Cir. 1983).
148. Big Horn County Elec. Coop. v. Adams, 219 F.3d 944, 948 (9th Cir. 2000); see supra
note 34 (referring to property ownership on the Crow Reservation).
149. Strate v. A-I Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 455 (1997).
150. Id. at 454-55.
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Court emphasized that the only right the Tribe reserved in the granting
instrument was the right "to construct crossings of the right-of-way at all points
reasonably necessary to the undisturbed use and occupan[cy] of the premises
affected by the right-of-way..' The Court reasoned that the Tribe had not
reserved any other right to exercise control over the easement. The Tribe did
not reserve these rights in the grant, because prior to the Strate decision all
parties concerned understood that an easement only granted a right of use and
the possessory interest retained all other rights that were not inconsistent with
the use." By requiring an express reservation of control the Court ignored
basic property law and invalidated the Tribe's sovereign powers.
The Court expanded this misinterpretation by attaching the Tribe's
sovereignty to the right to exclude, as stated in Bourland. The right to exclude
was lost, because the right-of-way is open to the public and "[the Tribe)
retained no gatekeeping right."'" This is a nonsensical requirement, because
by definition the possessory interest can not retain a gatekeeping right over an
easement. As stated previously, tribal sovereign powers are based on more than
the power to exclude."M It is interesting to note that the Strate opinion did not
evaluate the 1948 Act. 5 The statute and legislative history show that
Congress did not intend for the Act to be used as a tool for alienating trust
lands or divesting tribal sovereignty."
V. Reasons Why Big Horn Should Have Been Reversed
A. Contrasting Big Horn to Strate
The Big Horn decision relies on the Strate Court's holding that a right-of-
way on tribal lands is equivalent to nonmember fee lands for purposes of the
Montana rule.'" The Big Horn opinion listed five factors considered in
Strate:
(1) the legislation creating the right-of-way; (2) whether the
right-of-way was acquired with the consent of the tribe; (3)
whether the tribe had reserved the right to exercise dominion and
control over the right-of-way; (4) whether the land was open to the
151. Id. at 455.
152. See supra note 116.
153. Strate, 520 U.S. at 456.
154. See supra note 71; see Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144 (1982).
155. Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-55 (stating that the easement was granted under 25 U.S.C. §§
323-328, but not evaluating the meaning or intent of the statute).
156. There is no indication in the statute or its legislative history to suggest that Congress
intended the Act to alienate tribal lands or have an adverse effect on tribal sovereignty. To the
contrary, the statute empowers the tribes by requiring tribal consent for all types of easements.
25 U.S.C. §§ 323-328; S. REP. No. 80-823 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1033, 1036.




public; and (5) whether the right-of-way was under state
control.'
The Court went on to acknowledge that the Cooperative's easements only
meet the first three criteria, because the power line rights-of-way are not open
to the public and they are not controlled by the state.'" As for the first
criterion, neither Big Horn nor Strate examined the legislative intent of the
1948 Act"' ° Regarding the second criterion, consent is necessary to obtain
any easement, but the Tribe did not consent to give up its taxing authority. The
third criterion was discussed in the previous section. There was no reason for
the Crow Tribe to think that it would need to specifically reserve its rights to
govern in a contract providing for a power line easement.
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe the Court distinguished between a
tribe's power to govern and a tribe's power to contract, and held that by
agreeing to a contract for rents and royalties the Tribe did not contract away
its sovereign power to impose taxes. "A tribe's power to tax is not surrendered,
unless the contract explicitly states that it is in terms that allow for no other
reasonable interpretation.""'6 As to the Crow's power to impose a new tax, the
Cooperative's easements are not distinguishable from the oil and gas leases that
were at issue in Merrion.'" "Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the
assent of a nonmember, to the contrary, the nonmember's presence and conduct
on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the tribe may choose to
impose. ' '163
The Big Horn opinion rationalizes the fact that only three of the Strate
elements are present by referring to Red Wolf, which was also missing the forth
and fifth elements. The Court held that the decisive factor in both Red Wolf
and Big Horn was the Tribe's failure "to reserve its right to exercise 'dominion
or control over the right-of-way."" This is directly opposed to the holding
in Merrion.
In Strate and Red Wolf the issue was the extent of tribal court jurisdiction,
while in Big Horn the issue was tribal taxation. The Big Horn Court
discounted this distinction by referring to the Supreme Court's pronouncement
in Strate stating "that legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction are
158. Id. at 950 (citing to Strate, 520 U.S. at 454-56; Montana Dep't of Transp. v. King, 191
F.3d 1108, 1113 (gth Cir. 1999)).
159. Id. at 950.
160. See supra note 156.
161. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 145-48.
162. There are many similarities between easements and profit a pendre. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF PROPERTY SERVITUDES § 1.2(2), at 12 (2000) ("A profit a pendre is an easement, that
confers the right to enter and remove timber, minerals, oil, gas, game, or other substances from
land in the possession of another.").
163. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 147.
164. Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 950.
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coextensive."'" The Strate Court made this pronouncement in order to
discount the distinction between adjudicatory jurisdiction at issue there and the
regulatory jurisdiction that was at issue in Montana, Brendale, and Bourland.
None of these cases dealt with taxation. The Big Horn Court ignored the
distinction noted in Red Wolf, that the taxing power is broader than tribal court
jurisdiction.'"
Big Horn is also distinguishable from Strate based on the type of easement
that is at issue. The land under a public highway easement is not useful to the
servient estate, except for possible mineral rights. In contrast the land
underneath a power line can be used for grazing and other agricultural pursuits.
Under the Department of Interior's regulations the applicant for a right-of-way
must expressly agree "that the applicant will not interfere with the use of the
lands by or under the authority of the landowners for any purpose not
inconsistent with the primary purpose for which the right-of-way is
granted." 67 The Cooperative had to expressly agree to the stipulations in the
regulations when it obtained its easements.
The regulations distinguish highway rights-of-way from other types of
easements covered by the statutes, in that state laws apply to highway rights-of-
way." This is based on the original statute that authorized the Secretary of
Interior to grant highway rights-of-way.'t The courts have interpreted this to
allow for improvements within pre-existing highway rights-of-way without
approval by the Secretary, as long as the improvements comply with state
law.z There are no provisions in the statutes or the regulations for applying
State law to power line rights-of-way. It is also worth noting that the highway
grant in Strate contained no term limit, while the Cooperative's grants have a
fifty-year term.
The last distinction between Strate and Big Horn is the tribe's interest in the
subject matter and in the sovereign power that the Courts are extinguishing.
The tribal courts are an important part of tribal self-government, but the Strate
Court's limitation on the extent of their jurisdiction is not crucial to the Tribe's
survival. On the other hand, tribal self-government depends on the ability to
165. Id. (referring to Strate, 520 U.S. at 453).
166. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Red Wolf, 196 F.3d 1059, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1999). The
Atkinson decision would seem to clearly stale that the taxing power is no greater than other
regulatory authority, but this was not clear at the time of the Big Horn decision, and it may still
be disputed in cases where the property is not clearly held in fee by a nonmember. See Atkinson
Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001).
167. 25 C.F.R. § 169.5(k) (2001).
168. 25 C.F.R. § 169.28 (2001).
169. 25 U.S.C. § 311 (1994).
170. United States v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 318 U.S. 206, 210-11 (1943); United
States v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 434 F. Supp 625 (D. Mont. 1977) (stating that a
telephone line could be buried in a pre-existing highway right-of-way without following the




tax and raise revenues for essential functions.' The Big Horn decision
strikes at the very heart of tribal sovereignty. The Tribe has a legitimate
interest in regulating its sole provider of electricity and the ad valorem tax was
an appropriate way to raise revenue.
B. Big Horn Sets a Bad Precedent
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Big Horn overextends the Montana rule and
is in direct conflict with the current Indian policy of government-to-government
relations. While Congress and the Executive branch of the Federal Government
are working to promote tribal self-government and independence, the courts
have consistently taken away the attributes of self-government." The usual
canons of construction have been ignored and the presumptions that once
favored the tribes have been turned against them."r Big Horn defies the basic
definition of inherent tribal sovereignty.
Another reason why the Big Horn decision was .misguided is that, despite
the Court's holding in Strate,"74 easements are not substantially the same as
fee lands. Congress' intent in passing the 1948 Act was to simplify the process
for obtaining easements across tribal trust lands.75 The statute recognized
tribal self-government and established requirements similar to those that would
pertain to two neighbors negotiating an easement. The grantee cannot condemn
the grantor's land, and instead he must receive consent. Both parties understand
that only the right of use will pass with the easement. There is nothing in the
statute to suggest that the grantor will lose other substantial rights.
The Tribe should have challenged the Big Horn decision, because, the
Supreme Court had consistently treated taxation differently from other tribal
sovereignty issues prior to its holding in Atkinson.76 The Court emphasized
the importance of taxation in Merrion and, until the Atkinson decision, upheld
tribal taxes every time that it ruled on the issue ." The Montana opinion did
refer to taxes, but the Big Horn opinion overanalyzed Montana when it claimed
that the Tribe could only tax the activities of nonmembers and not their
171. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 137 (1982); see supra note 11.
172. In general the Supreme Court has progressively narrowed the scope of tribal sovereignty
since the late 1970s. The Justices that advocated for tribal rights, Blackmun, Brennan, and
Marshall, are no longer on the Court. The Strate decision was unanimous and shows a complete
shift in the Court's understanding of Indian law. See Fredericks, supra note 15, at 380-83, 400-02.
173. See supra Parts lI.B, II.C; Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 569 (1981)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 456-59 (1989).
174. See supra notes 116, 117.
175. See supra note 156.
176. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 121 S. Ct. 1825 (2001).
177. See supra Part III.A; Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137-39 ("Viewing the taxing power of Indian
tribes as an essential instrument of self-government and territorial management has been a shared
assumption of all three branches of the Federal Government.").
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property interests. "8 The Tenth Circuit's balancing test applied in Atkinson
was a fair reconciliation of Montana and Merrion,'" but the Supreme Court
chose to simplify Indian sovereignty and apply a bright line test of property
ownership." Nonmembers that do not receive a benefit from a tribe should
not be taxed, but if there is a benefit bestowed upon the nonmember a
balancing test is appropriate.
If the Crow Tribe had pursued a petition for certiorari, the Court could have
reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding without overturning Strate. Big Horn fits
squarely in Montana's first exception."' The Tribe and the Cooperative have
an ongoing consensual relationship and a 3% ad valorem tax is an appropriate
form of taxation. In the alternative, the Court could have reversed Big Horn
based on the second Montana exception. Electricity is an essential commodity,
and the conduct of the Cooperative "has a direct effect on the Tribes political
integrity, economic security, and health and welfare.""
All these arguments show that Big Horn was a poor decision and this
suggests that the Tribe should have challenged the decision. It is
understandable that with the current make up of the Supreme Court, the Tribe
felt that its chances for success were slim, but Big Horn would have given
tribal sovereignty interests a better chance than they faced under Atkinson.
Conclusion
The Atkinson decision was another serious reversal for tribal sovereignty,
because the power to tax activity within the reservation is essential to self-
government. The Big Horn decision was a flawed interpretation of property
law and the Montana exceptions, and it is a threat to the stability of tribal
relations with nonmembers. The status of tribal easements is crucial to both
tribes and nonmembers. Many of the existing easements on tribal trust lands
are nearing the end of their term and holders of these easements will need to
negotiate with the tribes for the required consent to renew the grants. The
uncertainty about what a tribe is consenting to will drive up the price of that
consent. In the energy field there is a drastic need for more transmission
capacity. This means more power line easements across tribal lands and the
current uncertainty in the law will translate into delays and higher prices.
The tribes are free to negotiate for the best possible deal for their consent.
The regulations state that the consideration for consent "shall not be less than
but not limited to the fair market value of the rights granted."'8 3 In several
178. See supra Part I1l.C; see Big Horn, 219 F.3d at 951.
179. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247, 1256-57 (10th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 532
U.S. 645 (2001).
180. Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 653 (2001).
181. See supra Part 11I.C.
182. See supra Part IlI.C: Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66 (1981).
183. 25 C.F.R. § 169.12 (2001).
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cases the starting point for these negotiations has been the cost benefit to the
applicant for building the project across tribal lands, as opposed to using an
alternative route.'" Using this approach the fair market value of tribal lands
increases dramatically. With Big Horn as law in the Ninth Circuit, tribal
sovereignty will be on the negotiating table every time a new easement is
sought or a party renews an existing easement. What is the fair market value
of sovereignty?
184. United States v. Pend Oreille County Pub. Util. Dist. No. I, 135 F.3d 602, 608-09 (9th
Cir. 1998) (setting out a formula for computing the most valuable alternative for compensating
a tribe for the use of its lands).
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